

Practical Aesthesis

Rob Shields, Nicholas Hardy (University of Alberta)
Existential and Phenomenological Theory and Culture, FHSSC Congress, York University
Toronto. May 29 2023.

Abbreviated conference version. Not for citation.

Aesthesis, the classical term for sensing and perceiving, is at the heart of innumerable problems that plague global society. Even the recognition of these problems can be taken as an example of aesthesis awakening from the ‘anaesthesia’ of consumer society. The purpose of this paper is to open a conversation on aesthesis as central to critical cultural theory at this time. Starting with an exploration of Pre-Socratic and classical debates, we consider the role of the body, affect, and of the intangible or virtual. Although abridged for the purposes of a conference presentation, we trace the codification of aesthesis into Western theories of aesthetics (for background, see e.g. Eagleton, 1991; this is a continuing problem in texts e.g. Herzogenrath 2020 which includes contributions from key scholars working in this area). Drawing on a relational interpretation of Protagoras’ aesthesis, we argue that modern pragmatists such as William James and more contemporary thinkers, recognize and develop the relational and ethical aspects of aesthesis. Given the limitations of space, we will move from a discussion of classical sources to follow sociological work and social theory on the *polis* to assay the political potential of aesthesis. We thus only briefly indicate the relevance of a number of twentieth century thinkers — Durkheim, Klossowski, Deleuze, Bataille, not to mention Hannah Arendt, Maria Lugones or new research on urban cultures of care (Gabauer et al. 2022; Schillmeier 2020).

Aesthesis (αἴσθησις) is a classical Greek term for sense perception, and also the root of the more formal language of beauty and style, *aesthetics*. More prosaically, aesthesis names a commonly shared experience or sensation of an event, thing or place. As a direct mode of engagement of the material reality of daily life, ‘aesthesis’ distinguishes itself from aesthetics, an ordered regime of sensual experience. Sometimes spelt according to the direct Greek transcription *aisthesis*, and sometimes in Latin or later versions as *esthesis* or *aesthesia*, this apperception stands at the nexus of the body’s sensory world of material interaction and the politics of collectively acknowledged perceptions. Aesthesis is an essential foundation for formalized aesthetic judgments of taste, linking embodied *eros*, to the perceptually beautiful, the erotic (Keller, 1989) and the pragmatically performed good.

Aistheta, or sensory phenomena, affect the body through multiple senses — rain is wet but is not just water: it falls with characteristic sounds depending on the ‘type’ of rain and has both its own visual properties and effects on visibility and tactility. *Aesthesis* is thus often a bundle of apperceptions and experiences which we attend to. In some cases, it is thus associated with forms of *synaesthesia*, the intersection of senses and sensations. By contrast, an inability to interact creatively, perceive and react, is *anaesthesia*. *Synasthesis* gives an important hint about aesthesis: it is a template for imagining unconstrained sensoria where the senses mesh and collide showing us that there are ‘other ways to hear, to see’ (Dunlop, 2002, p. 33).

Especially for an English-language readership, translations of Jacques Rancière’s work have usefully reinvigorated attention to aesthesis but mostly from the standpoint of popular aesthetics and their relation to the theories and codes of formal Aesthetics (1989; 2003). We

signal a respectful distinction from works such as *Politics and Aesthetics* (Rancière 2011; Rancière and Hallward 2019) in that aesthesis does not maintain his need to disassociate mind from body to engage in emancipatory thought. Rather, it is embedded in practice. What we might call “*practical aesthesis*” mobilises the activity of the body within everyday life to stimulate the possibility of emancipatory thought via practices of reality which always exceed regimes of experience ordained by formal aesthetics.

Classical *Aesthesis*: Protagoras to Plato

For Heraclitus (6th century B.C.E.), stimuli, *aistheta*, are qualities rather than substances. They are powers (*dynameis*) with the capacity of either affecting (*poiein*) or being affected (*paschein*) by them (Plato, 1973 ss 156a). For Pre-Socratic thinkers such as Anaxagoras and Protagoras (5th century B.C.E.) aesthesis designated the physiological processes involved in perceiving objects (contact, mixture, penetration, vision). This remains a critical counterpoint to the better-known Platonic tradition. The Pre-Socratic position was critiqued as not giving a reliable access to truth, but according to Sextus Empiricus, embodiment is crucial to knowledge (Guthrie, 1992). Protagoras’ *Aisthánesthai* (αἰσθάνεσθαι, ‘to perceive’) are said to be a direct mode of apperception (whether sensuous or not), aesthesis being meant to include all immediate convictions (*epistatai*) (Taylor, 2014). By extension, aesthesis changes depending on age and the conditions of a person’s body.

In Protagoras’ Pre-Socratic philosophy, the gamut of the perceptive possibilities of phenomena are immersed in matter itself (encompassing all possible things that can appear to anyone, e.g., sensations of cold or heat). *Aesthesis* always has a *logos* in reality, whether a hallucination, the taste of wine, or the intuition of a *physis*. *Aesthesis* is a relation, a mutuality of bodies and things: ‘Each thing smiles, has allure, calls forth aesthesis.’ It is affective not cognitive. It is that which demands attention. Hillman argues that this connects aesthesis to the body and to *eros* in Greek mythology: “‘Calling forth,’ provoking, *kaleo*: this was...Aphrodite’s main characteristic, *kallos*, beauty,’ (Hillman, 1982, cited in Keller, 1989, p. 154).

For Aristotle (4th century B.C.E.), the senses were incapable of error in relation to their proper objects but judgment between the senses required reason. *Koinē Aisthēsis* is a ‘common sensible’ that is the object of no specific sense for Aristotle. These include movement and rest, number, shape and size (Aristotle, 1964 ss 418a-425b), as well as perception of sensible things (*aisthetón*), the distinction between senses, and the perception that we perceive. However, unlike pure Platonic forms, the perception of things leads to opinion (*doxa*), not true knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη, epistēmē*). Mid-twentieth century opinion on Aristotle’s discussion viewed it as transitional and beset by problems arising from the indistinction of perception and sensation in classical Greek (Hamlyn, 1959, p. 11).

Aesthesis as Crisis and Rescue

More recently Welsch has argued for taking the Aristotelian position more seriously for grounding rationality in the sensual (1987). The Pre-Socratic notion of aesthesis offered by Protagoras and Theaetetus is a political, mathematical and philosophical crisis for Rationality’s taboo that experience and the senses must be kept apart from the purity of abstraction and ideas.

Aesthesis as apprehension is echoed in Kant’s discussion of aesthetic judgment as a kind of cerebral ‘recognition’ of an intangible quality of beauty that is not in the object but is nonetheless a quality of the object that we apprehend. However, in contrast to the Kantian

tradition, Whitehead asks about aesthesis as immediate prehension. Gadamer, (1998, pp. 60-61) also notes that in *Theaetetus*, aesthesis refers to the power of mathematical or geometrical evidence, as in the direct apprehension of geometrical proofs when they are demonstrated. The reality that is discovered is within perception, but immediately perceived, such as the power of a geometry demonstration and evidence, notwithstanding individual differences between persons. Thus, *Aesthesis* is shared and immediate, but neither arbitrary nor idiosyncratic. Like any morality, Aesthetic judgments are self-referential; they are universally applied, valid at all times and places (Maffesoli 1991). Contrast this with the emergent *event* of aesthesis as a prehension embedded in the moment of encounter with the world and Others (Parma, 2015). In reaction, Mignolo calls for the decolonization of aesthesis from Enlightenment Aesthetics (Mignolo, 2010).

For Protagoras, aesthesis as sense perception is not only collective but concerns the materiality and immateriality (i.e., the qualities) of an *epistēmē* that is diverse and spatial in Heraclitus's and Sextus Empiricus' sense of *physis* (which is immanent, in motion, as in *dynamis*). Gadamer refers to this as a *politeia*, a social-political space or *polis* as opposed to nature (1998). That is to say, aesthesis responds to a world that is a 'landscape' rather than 'bare nature'; or even, a multivalent, social spatialisation (Shields, 2013) or cultural topology (Lury, Parisi and Terranova, 2012). *Epistēmē* is thus not naively static but dynamic and relativistic, according to Protagoras.

In Gadamer's estimation, Whitehead echoes Protagoras' approach to aesthesis. Debaise (2014) claims that, for Whitehead, 'The *aesthetic* becomes the site of all ontology.' Such an approach is reflected in contemporary affect theory and cultural studies where perception is, first of all, a matter of being affected bodily in engagement with patterns of difference oriented toward the future; in short, aesthesis (Hoogland, 2014, p. 2). In this approach, perception is affective, relational and *aesthetic* in the classical sense of aesthesis (Shaviro, 2009, p. 57). Becoming is not continuous because each occasion, each act of becoming, is unique, contra Bergson who subsumes these moments to a general theory of duration (*durée*) or Heidegger, who subsumes them to a general movement of Being (*Dasein*). Contra interpretations of Whitehead's *aesthetics* which stress its links to rational knowledge (Sherburne, 1961), contemporary radical empiricism stresses that he understands aesthesis as the body's physical and non-conscious sense-perceptual prehension or response to the world (Whitehead, 1938). From this event, from the encounter 'of one actuality in a world of actualities,' Whitehead defines *aesthetics* as a form of knowledge that highlights the outstanding and significant (1938, p. 165). In his lectures at the Collège de France, Merleau-Ponty tantalizingly situates it as a 'thinking of the sensible' intrinsic to the phenomenon of Being rather than distanced from it (1997: 186).

Thanks to the senses and their conjunctive relation to the world, reason's contact with reality is not *representational* but *coextensive*. In light of Lucretius' thesis on the senses, Serres defines perception as situated within a space of communication in which things continuously *call forth* attention (Lucretius 1954, v. 469; Serres, 2000, p. 49)..

Dupréel reaches for the heart of the Protagorean doctrine of aesthesis by distinguishing between individual knowledge and knowledge of shared value that is socially affirmed (possibly similar to Aristotle's 'everyday life' or *koinē aisthēsis*): 'It is the city itself' (Dupréel, 1948, p. 23). This places Protagoras' maxim within the ambit of *social life*. However, Dupréel then moves away from a spatial perspective on the *polis* as a social ensemble to focus on law. By contrast, we want to develop this insight. It is worthwhile emphasising the assembled heteronomy of things

that constitutes the urban and ‘things that matter’ for pragmatic and strategic purposes as the basis of its politics. This follows Protagoras’ vocabulary in which he refers to the sources of stimuli, things, as *chrēmata* (χρήματα) or things of value (resources, money). This might be termed a relational interpretation of Protagoras.

Attending

How does classic aesthesis help us today? Beyond the scope of the authors we have cited, there is a late twentieth century line of social theory that also includes Deleuze, Bataille, Maffesoli, Cooper and Lingis that is crucial to an examination of aesthesis as a social form of almost autonomic attraction, reaction and interaction. The theatricality of everyday life is placed in the foreground; or better, the game of encounters, in which appearance, ritual linked to a social atmosphere, the ability to adopt a plurality of roles, or moving from one circle or ‘tribe’ to another all generate an infinite dance. From this emerges a ‘pictorial rhetoric’ made of empathic adhesions to community and collective settings that transform sociality into a *theatrum mundi*, into a general and multidimensional representation. Images, emotions, the polysemy of situations and encounters predominate, creating a play of mutually superimposed interactions, images and words (Maffesoli, 1993, 1996; see also Cooper, 1974, p. 150). Aesthesis marks a social form of *eros* — mundane but fundamental attractions and repulsions — that is felt at the gut level. It is the ‘feeling’ or affect of sociality.

Aesthesis foregrounds the sensate body within social space and entails a shift from a concern with formal aesthetics as a question of order and form to questions of relations and thus situational ethics, a move pioneered by Maffesoli in his postmodern approach to the social beginning in the late 1970s. This entails a concern with a subject’s tactile immersion in the local social world. Rancière later considers French nineteenth century amateur and workers’ attempts to appropriate aesthetics instrumentally as a means to self-advancement (Rancière, 1989, 2003; see also de Toqueville, 1983, p. 231) but which also opens experiences of aesthesis. If these practices are ludic, it is no surprise that they can be emancipating (Rancière, 1991, p. 79ff.). However, our concern is neither with the class political instrumentality of this appropriation of hegemonic Aesthetic codes nor with the moral opprobrium these elicited from the guardians of taste. Play produces serious effects but loses its power of experiment, the counter-power of aesthesis, when it is framed as a means (Rancière, 2011).

Adapting Simone Weil, Matthews argues that attention to aesthesis, to our encounters and relations is the foundation of social and legal obligations in a ‘given configuration of power relations that orders, distributes and enframes our perception of the world’ (Matthews, 2019, p. 5). In Weil’s philosophy, attention is not scrutiny, it is both reflective and affective. It involves attending to a given situation or object that is not determined in advance. Weil argued that rights were abstracted from obligations which were more rooted in needs, places and social interactions (Weil, 2005, pp. 221—230). Obligations arise from comprehending and empathizing with the fragility of Others that can arise out of an *aesthetic* attending to the encounters and situations in which we find ourselves. For Weil, this gives rise to a situation-ethical response. However, this authentic solidarity can be eroded and lost in the institutional detour of granting rights followed by the calculation and balancing of interests and entitlements, all of which tend to become self-referential rather than reciprocal. Weil’s outlook could be extended to include the non-human and abiotic as equally fragile in the face of climate warming (Matthews, 2019, p. 16; see also Tam et

al. 2021). However, Munster warns that including the non-human requires us to sort out how to embrace the imperceptible as well as what humans perceive.

Contemporary network experience conjoins machines and humans (Munster, 2013, p. 7) but does not presuppose that experience is then rooted in or limited to human aesthesis. James's pluralism is an ongoing challenge, not a *fait accompli* (Savransky, 2019). Technologically mediated social life is not only conjunctive but divisive and disjunctive. For example, Berardi's phenomenology of sensibility distinguishes between *conjunctive* and *connective* modes of interaction in light of the mutation in the texture of human experience, and in the fabric of the world, provoked by the shift to a digital technosphere (Berardi, 2015, p. 12). Whereas *connection* designates 'the logical and necessary implication, or inter-functionality, between segments' (as a product of the logical (technology of the) mind, connection no longer belongs to the realm of nature), *conjunction* concerns the sphere of sensibility that remains within nature (Berardi, 2015, p. 15). *Aesthesis* produces conjunctive concatenations. These are creative acts that create an 'infinite number of constellations that do not follow the lines of a preconceived pattern or an embedded program' (Berardi, 2015, p. 13); they are a source of singularity, an event, not a structure, which happens by chance in space and time.

Berardi's discussion of conjunction and sensibility foregrounds integral aspects of aesthesis. Contra the codified logical operations of connective mediation, 'Sensibility is the faculty that makes it possible to find a path that does not yet exist, a link between things that have no intrinsic or logical implication' (Berardi, 2015, p. 13). Returning to the body, the sense of touch is of particular import: the skin is the sensible conjunctive interface par excellence (cf. Bateson, 1979). Together the senses acknowledge the immediate experience of reality. In Batesonian terms, one could say that aesthesis refers to the senses' capacity to perceive the pattern that connects the diverse elements of a situation (Bateson, 1979, p. 8-11). In contrast, the connective technology of language has the power to negate the sensate 'canvas of shared perceptions and projections that we call reality' (Berardi, 2015, p. 17). The abstractions and reductions of common worlds to a sphere of connective, syntactic, exchanges that have accompanied our technological society aggravate the erosion of empathic understanding, the complicity of relations that conjunctive aesthesis highlights.

Aesthesis gains importance as we shift our anthropocentric outlook toward the recognition of the Other, and even further to interspecies respect. A more mindful acknowledgment of our shared environment challenges the anthropocentrism of Aesthetic traditions and the normative limits imposed on sensoria and attention. To shift the focus back to the roots of the aesthetic project and experience, the history of aesthesis provides a useful baseline. *Aesthesis* acts as a curative to the 'lethal mutilation of experience called aesthetics' (Cooper, 1974, p. 150). However, the opposite trend is very much in evidence in technological development. On the one hand, people use mobile communication technologies and social media to connect with each other. However, we hardly ask what the novel sensibilities of contemporary technological networking could be? Commercial interests have commodified networking so that they are manipulated experiences of attachment that rapidly fall into standardization, obsolescence and disposability (Baranzoni, 2017, p. 156).

An objection could be raised that cognition and certainly all use of language employs a certain 'mutilation of experience' but this ignores the essential shift being advanced by James, which is from the cognitive realm of philosophy to the lived realm of embodied experience. To

escape the tendencies toward technologically enabled anaesthesia, a continuing critique of the continued colonization of aesthesis in new forms and media is essential.

While it is clear from this survey of aesthesis that the concept is a disruptive presence barely contained by the theoretical ‘gasketing’ of aesthetic philosophy, might decolonial theorists speculate about an extraneous, non-European provenance of this notion? Disentangling these epistemological relations seems essential to the coherence of decolonial aesthesis, lest a colonial medium be used as a means to achieve anticolonial ends (and this would be equivocal, since the use of colonialist logic and practices invariably yield colonialist outcomes). Instead, it would appear that aesthesis undermines and bypasses the univocal orthodoxies of formal aesthetic convention (see Mignolo and Vasquez 2010).

Ethical Aesthetics

In this broad vein, Guattari called for a new aesthetic paradigm beginning in the fine arts to recast the atomized division and discipline of individuals in contemporary ‘societies of control’ (Guattari, 1992). Maffesoli joins up aesthesis and ethics in an ‘ethics of aesthetics’ that has been translated as ‘ethical aesthetics’ (Maffesoli, 1991, 1993) anchored in places and the *ethos* of situations. This designates a disposition in a social situation. In everyday life, a balancing of proximity and distance, engagement and withdrawal occurs. What is an ethical aesthetics of humans and non-humans in the world together that recognizes our ecological obligations (Latour 2018)?

Can aesthesis generate a politics as well as a situation ethics? The global *polis* can be understood as exactly such a diverse community. The polity is the *result* of aesthesis, rather than merely a dull, homogenous multitude of similarity that might be produced discursively through demagoguery (Moreault, 1999; Sjöholm, 2015). Amin and Thrift argue that “in a city there is no simple presence or absence or foreground and background or natural and unnatural or withdrawn and sensual to be found: these concepts have evaporated as infrastructure moves things around and between cities” (Amin & Thrift, 2017, p. 61). This urban register of relations assembles and attaches different groups, indeed humans and non-humans, and the social and ecological. ‘Urban obligations’ constitute the ligatures of the *polis* as an associative form and require attending to the multiple layers of human-institutional-animal-plant-material relations.

We can read this as a supplement to the growing literature on ‘the right to the city,’ which Henri Lefebvre proposed as the ‘right’ to participation of those often excluded from full urban life. Thus, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos argues that urban obligations are a network of bonds expressed in laws, broadly understood. Laws constitute our social and urban reality, making the city into what he terms a ‘lawscape’ (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2014). Similar to Spinoza, Maffesoli (1991) locates experience in attunement to the *ethos* of a situation or place and understands our attention to this *ethos* as the founding action of an ethics which is always situational and affective. A bottom-up situation ethics contrasts with moral codes which are universally and homogeneously applied to situations and experience as judgments that found abstract political rights. However, this counterposes ethics and aesthesis against morals and politics. A situation ethics grounded in an aesthetic art of engagement seeks harmony contra an abstract, universal politics based on moral correctness and orthodoxy. Matthews, Arendt and others argue there is a route from ethics to politics through the *polis*, as a sociopolitical organization of obligation.

William James prefigures both Deleuze and Weil. For the fundamental operation of attending and relating to a context, James conceived of lived relations not just as instants. They have a duration and are experiences of change and of differences, of the edges between objects and their contexts, between this and that, much like the edges of tiles in a mosaic (James 1997:198). “Relationality is the experience of passage — a vague edging with, against, between, away from — that actualizes the related things. It is experience as conjoining/disjoining” (Munster, 2013, p. 35). However, James’s pragmatism also recognizes that attention and time can be colonized and enclosed by normative and predictive structures. These prescribe reactions to situations thus overdetermining any aesthesis or ethical aesthetics. The mesh of interrelated institutions and technologies may foreclose any surprise or shock even in the everyday. Attention is the basis of relation which subtends engagement, conjunction and mutual obligation. Making original relations is always going to be a struggle. Yet we need to draw authentic insights or creative connections, including between local events and a global process such as climate warming. Rather than a dualism of ethical aesthetics versus moral politics, these are ongoing challenges to connect by acknowledging that the univocality of orthodoxies actually suppresses a diversely equivocal and heterodox world — making “patchworks into networks” (Lazzarato, 2006, p. 180; cited in Munster, 2013, p. 133).

Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos provides the bridge from situation ethics arising from aesthesis to politics not as a matter of codified rights and morals but the social organization of obligation. *Aesthesis* is the relation between the perceptible or real, and the collective, that is, the *polis*. On one hand, the polity involves an ethical *relation*, but it entails a political *process*. This is an essential area for further investigation and collective action. Munster and others point out that contemporary reality concatenates humans and non-human, demanding new sensoria and creating new forms of attention.

Politicising an Ethical *Aesthesis*

How to escape the reassuring blanket of contemporary anaesthesia? There is an active search for new social and environmental ethico-aesthetic protocols that ask, how can we “compose ourselves as collectivities/networks? What novel discoveries can we make about our/the world’s relations of betweenness, with-ness, to-ness, and-ness?” (Munster, 2013, p. 193). Relational, *ethical* aesthesis is a search for ways of generating news spaces and worlds that open out the *polis* to embrace repressed affects, exploited Others and non-humans. It is a project to assemble new collectivities, not just adherents to enthusiasms of the moment. *Ethical* aesthesis is not just a matter of civil manners, nor taste, nor a new Aesthetics, but a matter of seeking to sense more profoundly, of sharpening our senses. It seeks nuance to allow for the indiscernible, appreciate the imperceptible and distant, and attend to the radically Other. Because this entails a new sense of the world and a more inclusive practice of living together, this is necessarily collective and thus politicises aesthesis.

Aesthesis is an open problematic that includes a series of strategic questions for our time. It names a connecting thread that allows us to learn from classical theorists while stitching together a dispersed set of discussions concerning our collective sense of reality as well as individual perception. Our argument is that the conception of *practical aesthesis* is fundamental to the problematic of the *polis* as a political totality that now exceeds humans.

References

- Amin, A., & Thrift, N. (2017). *Seeing Like a City*. Polity.
- Aristotle. (1964). *De Anima (Of the Soul)* (Vol. 3). Clarendon Press.
- Aristotle. (1984). *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* (H. G. Apostle, Trans.). Peripatetic Press.
- Aristotle. (1989). *Metaphysics* (H. Tredennick, Trans.). Harvard University Press.
<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0052%3Abook%3D13%3Asection%3D1080b>
- Baranzoni, S. (2017). Aesthesis and Nous: Technological Approaches. *Parallax*, 23(2), 147—163.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13534645.2017.1299296>
- Bateson, G. (1979). *Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity*. E. P. Dutton.
- Benasayag, Miguel, Diego Sztulwark, and Anne Weinfeld. (2002). *Du contre-pouvoir*. Nouv. éd., Editions la Découverte.
- Berardi, F. (2015). *And: Phenomenology of the End*. Semiotext(e).
- Bogue, R. (2003). *Deleuze on Music, Painting and the Arts*. Routledge.
- Bradshaw, C. J. A., et al. (2021). Underestimating the Challenges of Avoiding a Ghastly Future. *Frontiers in Conservation Science*, 1. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fcosc.2020.615419>
- Burke, E. (2017). *Edmund Burke: A Philosophical Enquiry Into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* (J. T. Boulton, Ed.). University of Notre Dame Press.
- Carbone, M. (2000). "The Thinking of the Sensible." Giacomo Carissimi (trans.) in *Chiasms: Merleau Ponty's Notion of Flesh*. State University of New York Press. 121-30.
- Castoriadis, C. (1987 [1975]). *The Imaginary Institution of Society*. Polity Press.
- Cornford, F. (1991). *From Religion to Philosophy*. Princeton University Press.
- Cooper, D. (1974). *The Grammar of Living*. Penguin Books.
- Debaise, D. (2014). *Possessive Subjects: A Speculative Interpretation of Nonhumans* (T. Jellis, Trans.). University of Minnesota Press.
- Dejanovic, S. (2015). The Question of Re-turning: Toward or Away from the Virtual? *Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy*, 23(1), 79—101. <https://doi.org/10.5195/JFFP.2015.682>
- Deleuze, G. (1995). *Negotiations, 1972-1990* (1757650). Columbia University Press.
- Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1987). *Mille Plateaux: A Thousand Plateaus* (B. Massumi, Trans.). University of Minnesota Press.
- Dunlop, R. (2002). In Search of Tawny Grammar: Poetics, Landscape and Embodied Ways of Knowing. *Canadian Journal of Environmental Education (CJEE)*, 7(2), 23—37.
- Dupréel, E. (1948). *Les Sophistes*. Éditions du Griffon.
- Eagleton, T. (1991). *The Ideology of the Aesthetic*. Wiley.
- Empiricus, S. (1961). *Adversus Mathematicos*. 7. B.G. Teubneri.
- Gabauer, Angelika, et al. (eds). (2022). *Care and the City: Encounters with Urban Studies*. Routledge.
- Gadamer, H.-G. (1998). *The Beginning of Philosophy*. Continuum.
- Girard, René (1977). *Violence and the Sacred*. Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Guattari, F. (1992). *Chaosmose*. Galilée.
- Guthrie, W. (1992). *Historia de la filosofía griega*. Gredos.
- Hamlyn, D. W. (1959). Aristotle's Account of Aesthesis in the De Anima. *The Classical Quarterly*, 9(1), 6—16.
- Heraclitus, of E. (2003). *Fragments: The collected wisdom of Heraclitus* (B. Haxton, Trans.). Penguin Books.
- Herzog, W. (n.d.). On the Absolute, the Sublime, and Ecstatic Truth | Arion (M. Weigel, Trans.). *Arion*. Retrieved July 19, 2021, from <http://www.bu.edu/arion/on-the-absolute-the-sublime-and-ecstatic-truth/>
- Herzogenrath, Bernd, ed. *Practical Aesthetics*. Thinking in the World. London ; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2021.
- Hillman, J. (1982). Anima mundi: The return of the soul to the world. *Spring*, 71—93.
- Hoogland, Renée (2014). *A Violent Embrace: Art and Aesthetics after Representation*. Dartmouth College Press.
- James, W. (1977). *The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition* (J. J. McDermott, Ed.). University of Chicago Press.
- Keller, C. (1989). Psychocosmetics and the Underworld Connection. In D. Griffin (Ed.), *The Archetypal Process: Self and Divine and Whitehead, Jung, and Hillman* (pp. 133—155). Northwestern University Press.
- Keeney, B. (1983). *Aesthetics of Change*. The Guilford Press.

- Knorr Cetina, K. (2007). Culture in Global Knowledge Societies: Knowledge Cultures and Epistemic Cultures. *Interdisciplinary Science Reviews* 32(4): 361—375.
- Latour, B. (2018). *Down to Earth: Politics in the New Climatic Regime*. Polity.
<https://www.wiley.com/en-ca/Down+to+Earth%3A+Politics+in+the+New+Climatic+Regime-p-9781509530595>
- Lazzarato, M. (2006). The Concepts of Life and the Living in the Societies of Control. In M. Fuglsang & B. Meyer Sorenson (Eds.), *Deleuze and the Social* (pp. 171—190). Edinburgh University Press.
- Lucretius. (1954). *De la Nature: Poème en six chants* (René Waltz, Trans.). Société d'édition *Les belles lettres*.
- Lucretius Carus, T. (1992). *Lucretius: On the Nature of Things* (W.H.D. Rouse, Trans. M.F. Smith, Rev.). Harvard University Press.
- Lugones, María (1987). Playfulness, 'World'-Travelling, and Loving Perception. *Hypatia* 2(2): 3—19.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1987.tb01062.x>.
- Lugones, Maria (2003). *Pilgrimages - Pelerinages*. Rowman and Littlefield.
- Lury, Celia. (2013). Topological Sense-Making Walking the Möbius Strip from Cultural Topology to Topological Culture. *Space and Culture* 16(2): 128—32. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1206331213475780>.
- Lury, Celia, Luciana Parisi, and Tiziana Terranova (2012). Introduction: The Becoming Topological of Culture. *Theory, Culture & Society* 29(4-5). (July): 3—35. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276412454552>.
- Maffesoli, M. (1991). The Ethic of Aesthetics. *Theory Culture and Society*, 8(1), 7—20.
- Maffesoli, M. (1993). *Au creux des apparences: Pour une éthique de l'esthétique*. Librairie générale française.
- Maffesoli, Michel. (1996). *The Time of the Tribes*. Sage.
- Matthews, D. (2019). Law and Aesthetics in the Anthropocene: From the Rights of Nature to the Aesthetics of Obligations. *Law, Culture and the Humanities*, 1743872119871830.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1743872119871830>
- Merleau-Ponty, M. (1997). *Notes des cours au Collège de France 1958—1959 et 1960—1961*, S. Menase (ed.). Gallimard.
- Mignolo, W. D., & Vasquez, R. (2010). Aisthesis decolonial. *Calle 14 revista de investigación en el campo del arte*, 4(4), 10—25. <https://doi.org/10.14483/21450706.1224>
- Moreault, F. (1999). Citoyenneté et représentation dans la pensée politique de Hannah Arendt. *Sociologie et Sociétés*, 31(2). <http://www.erudit.org/revue/socsoc/1999/v31/n2/001511ar.html>
- Munster, A. (2013). *An Aesthesis of Networks: Conjunctive experience in art and technology* (Grande Prairie Regional College - Internet Internet Access). MIT Press.
- Müsil, R. (1995). *The Man Without Qualities*. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
- Parma, L. R. (2015). Protágoras y el Significado de Aisthesis. *Revista de Filosofía*, dup(2), 127-149.
- Peters, F. E. (1967). *Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon*. NYU Press.
- Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, A. (2014). *Spatial Justice: Body, Lawscape, Atmosphere*. Taylor & Francis Group.
- Plato. (1973). *Theaetetus*. Clarendon Press.
- Rancière, Jacques, and Peter Hallward. (2003). Politics and Aesthetics: An Interview. *Angelaki* 8(2) (August): 191-211.
- Rancière, J. (2011). *The Politics of Aesthetics*. Continuum.
- Ryan, V. (2001). The Physiological Sublime: Burke's Critique of Reason. *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 63(2), 265—279.
- Savransky, M. (2021). The Pluralistic Problematic: William James and the Pragmatics of the Pluriverse. *Theory, Culture & Society* 38(2):141-59. <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0263276419848030>
- Schillmeier, M. (2020). Counter/Infections: Dis/Abling Spaces and Cultures. *Space and Culture*, August 10.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1206331220941285>.
- Schneider, J. (2019). New Media Pharmacology: Hansen, Whitehead, and Worldly Sensibility. *Theory, Culture & Society* 36(1): 133-54.
- Segall, M. D. (2011, March 11). Whitehead: Aesthetics as First Philosophy. *Footnotes2Plato*.
<https://footnotes2plato.com/2011/03/11/whitehead-aesthetics-as-first-philosophy/>
- Serres, Michel. (1980). *Le Passage Du Nord-Ouest*. Vol. 5 of *Hermes*. Editions de Minuit.
- Serres, M. (1982). *Hermes: Literature, Science, Philosophy*. John Hopkins University Press.
- Serres, M. (2000). *The Birth of Physics* (Jack Hawkes, Trans.), Clinamen Press.
- Shaviro, S. (2009). *Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics*. MIT Press.

- Sherburne, D. W. (1961). *A Whiteheadian Aesthetic. Some Implications of Whitehead's Metaphysical Speculation*. Yale University Press.
- Shields, R. (2013). *Spatial Questions: Social Spatialisations and Cultural Topologies*. London: Sage.
- Shields, R. (2006). Virtualities. *Theory Culture & Society*, 23(2—3), 284—286.
- Sjöholm, C. (2015). *Doing Aesthetics with Arendt: How to See Things*. Columbia University Press.
- Starr, G. G. (2002). Ethics, Meaning, and the Work of Beauty. *Eighteenth-Century Studies*, 35(3), 361—378.
- Summers, D. (2014). History of Aisthesis. In M. Kelly (Ed.), *Oxford Encyclopedia of Aesthetics* (2nd Ed. Online). Oxford University Press. <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199747108.001.0001/acref-9780199747108-e-544>
- Tam, K.-P., Leung, A., & Clayton, S. (2021). Research on climate change in social psychology publications: A systematic review. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 24. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajsp.12477>
- Taylor, A. E. (2014). *Plato: The Man and His Work (RLE: Plato)*. Routledge. <https://www.routledge.com/Plato-The-Man-and-His-Work-RLE-Plato/Taylor/p/book/9780415751582>
- Virno, P. (2013). *Saggio sulla negazione: per una antropologia linguistica*. Bollati Boringhieri.
- Weil, S. (2005). Draft Statement for a Statement of Human Obligations. In S. Miles (Ed.), *Simone Weil: An Anthology* (pp. 221—230). Penguin.
- Welsch, W. (1987). *Aisthesis: Grundzüge und Perspektiven der Aristotelischen Sinneslehre*. Klett-Cotta.
- Whitehead, A. N. (1938). *Modes of Thought*. Free Press.
- Winkler, J. (2017). "Material Blue." *Contemporary Aesthetics*, December 12. <https://www.contempaesthetics.org/newvolume/pages/article.php?articleID=813>.
- Wittgenstein, L. (2014). *Lecture on Ethics* (E. Zamuner, E. V. Di Lascio, & D. K. Levy, Eds.). John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated.
- Wyschogrod, E. (2006). *Crossover Queries: Dwelling with Negatives, Embodying Philosophy's Others*. Fordham Univ Press.